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Securities Fraud: The Tax Benefit Offset Rule of
Damages in Securities Litigation
Roger Austin, Thomas Anderson, Myrel Neumann, and
William Randall' invested $157,500 in a limited partnership or-
ganized in 1973 by B.J. Loftsgaarden. The partnership was or-
ganized for the purpose of financing the building and operation
of a hotel in Rochester, Minnesota. The offering memorandum
prepared by Loftsgaarden described the limited partnership as
a "tax shelter"2 promising investors substantial tax benefits3
during the early years of the partnership and participation in
the hotel's projected profits in later years.
The hotel opened in 1974, several months behind schedule
and at costs substantially in excess of those projected.4 It im-
mediately incurred significant operating losses.5 An investiga-
tion initiated by the investors revealed that Loftsgaarden had
knowingly made several fraudulent misrepresentations.6 The
1. The four plaintiffs in this action were among a total of 22 limited part-
ners investing in the limited partnership. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168,
172 (8th Cir. 1982) (Austin I), affid on rehearing, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-519).
2. The court defined "tax shelters" as investments allowing the investor
to offset certain "artificial losses"-noneconomic losses available as deductions
under the present tax laws-not only against the income from those invest-
ments but also against the investor's other income, usually from regular busi-
ness or professional activity. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 951 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1985) (Austin HI), cert granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No.
85-519).
3. Real estate limited partnerships are accorded a unique tax treatment
permitting the deduction of losses in excess of the amount initially invested.
See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702 (1985); Note, Real Estate Limited Partnerships and Allo-
cational Efficiency: The Incentive to Sue for Securities Fraud, 63 VA. L. REv.
669, 673 (1977).
4. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 951; Austin I, 675 F.2d at 175.
5. These losses were primarily due to Loftsgaarden's inability to obtain
the permanent financing on time, resulting in an additional six months of high
interest charges to the partnership. Austin , 675 F.2d at 175.
6. The offering memorandum specifically indicated that Loftsgaarden
could obtain interim construction financing at an interest rate of 9-1/2%; that
the construction loan interest would amount to $130,000; that the land lease
would run for 40 years; that construction would begin in May of 1973; that the
promoter would receive $103,000 for "overhead and profit;" that the furniture
and fixtures loan would be at a rate of 8%; and that long-term financing had
been firmly committed. Id. at 174-75. The district court found each of these
representations to be false. Id. at 175. Additionally, Loftsgaarden omitted any
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partnership ultimately defaulted and the hotel was sold in fore-
closure in 1978. 7
In 1976, the four investors filed a securities fraud action
against Loftsgaarden in federal district court. The jury found
Loftsgaarden liable under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933,8 section 10(b)9 and Rule 10b-510 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, the antifraud provisions of the Minnesota
securities laws,'1 and common-law fraud.'2 The district court
applied a rescissory measure of damages,13 awarding the plain-
tiffs the consideration paid, prejudgment interest, and attor-
neys' fees.14 Loftsgaarden appealed the award, arguing that the
district court committed reversible error in excluding any evi-
dence of tax benefits realized by the plaintiffs as a result of
their participation in the limited partnership. Loftsgaarden ar-
gued that such evidence was necessary to determine the plain-
tiffs' actual damages.15
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of
liability but vacated the damages award, holding that evidence
of any tax benefits received by the investor must be admitted to
reduce potential rescissory damages in a private securities fraud
action involving a tax shelter investment.16 On remand the
district court awarded the plaintiffs damages in the amount of
their initial investment, with interest, less tax benefits re-
ceived.' 7 Both sides appealed. The Eighth Circuit, en banc, in
explanation of the role his closely held corporations would assume in the de-
velopment. Id
7. Id at 176.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). The jury found liability under § 12(2) in an
advisory verdict. The district court concurred in the jury's finding. See Aus-
tin , 675 F.2d at 172.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
11. MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.01-80A.23 (1984).
12. The jury found that Loftsgaarden had knowingly made material mis-
representations and omissions in the offering memorandum upon which the
plaintiffs relied. The plaintiffs' claim, therefore, satisfied all of the necessary
elements of Rule 10b-5, the antifraud provisions of the Minnesota securities
laws, and common-law fraud. The parties agreed that the elements of these
various claims are identical. Austin I, 675 F.2d at 176 n.15.
13. Id at 172; see infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
14. According to the district court's computation, the plaintiffs' recoveries
were as follows: Austin, $64,610; Anderson, $64,787; Neumann, $96,385; Ran-
dall, $67,973. See Austin II, 768 F.2d at 957. Only plaintiffs Randall and Neu-
mann were awarded attorneys' fees. Id. at 952.
15. Austin I, 675 F.2d at 180.
16. Id at 181-84.
17. On remand, the district court determined the amount of permanent
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Austin v. Loftsgaarden (Austin II),18 upheld the Austin I
panel's holding.19
This Comment examines whether the tax benefit offset
rule can be reconciled with the applicable damages provisions
of the federal securities laws as applied by the courts. The
Comment also addresses the effect of the tax benefit offset rule
in light of the Government's role in tax shelter investments as
well as its effect on certain public policy goals embodied in the
tax benefits received by each of the plaintiffs as follows: Austin, $33,330; An-
derson, $29,615; Neumann, $57,014; Randall, $36,404. The parties did not con-
test these findings. The district court then determined that each plaintiff was
entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate of eight percent simple interest.
Each plaintiff's damages were calculated as the original amount invested, plus
eight percent simple interest from the date of purchase, less the amount of tax
benefits received. The plaintiffs' damages, thus calculated, were as follows:
Austin, $31,177; Anderson, $35,172; Neumann, $39,371; Randall, $31,569. Aus-
tin I, 768 F.2d at 952, 957.
18. 768 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov.
12, 1985) (No. 85-519).
19. The Eighth Circuit developed a different formula for computing the
measure of plaintiffs' rescissory damages under § 12(2) in light of the offset
rule, finding the district court, on remand, had erred in its formulation of
damages by awarding prejudgment interest on the total amount of considera-
tion paid by each plaintiff from the date of investment rather than awarding
interest only on the amount of money that each plaintiff was "out-of-pocket"
during each year of the investment. Id. at 958. The court further determined
that the district court had failed to take into account the tax consequences of
the plaintiffs' recovery. I. at 960. The court "assumed] that each plaintiff
[was] still in the fifty percent tax bracket and thus must receive twice the ...
amount of damages and net interest cost" so that each plaintiff's after-tax re-
covery would equal the actual damages sustained. Id. at 960-61. The final
formula adopted by the court thus required that each year's tax benefits be
subtracted from the plaintiffs' original investment on an annual basis to allow
the prejudgment interest to be based on an annually declining balance. The
court then doubled the final figure in order to account for the tax conse-
quences of the plaintiffs' recovery, assuming a fifty-percent tax bracket. Id. at
959-61. The result of applying this tax-offset formula was to reduce considera-
bly the damage awards granted by the district court on remand. See supra
note 17. The final recoveries awarded plaintiffs were as follows: Austin,
$7,666; Anderson, $18,790; Neumann, $1,984; Randall, $506. Austin II, 768 F.2d
at 961.
It is interesting to note that each plaintiff's individual tax situation was
considered in computing the historical tax benefits received, but in doubling
the award to take account of tax effects, the court simply assumed, without
any evidence, that each plaintiff was then in the fifty percent bracket. This
approach was criticized by the dissent in Austin II as demonstrative of "how
speculative and inaccurate the consideration of tax consequences can be in a
suit involving rescissionary damages." Id. at 963. Moreover, the assumption
that the award is taxable at ordinary income rates supports the view that, ab-
sent the application of the offset rule, the tax benefit rule would apply. See
intra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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securities laws. The Comment concludes that the result of the
tax benefit offset rule is to unfairly shift the economic conse-
quences of securities fraud to the Government, and ultimately
to the taxpayers, while allowing defrauding promoters to es-
cape the full consequences of their actions.
I. MEASURING DAMAGES IN SECURITIES
FRAUD CASES
An investor defrauded in a securities transaction may sue
for recovery under both the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).20
The specific remedy available under the Securities Act is rescis-
sion. Section 12(2) of the Act provides a defrauded purchaser
the option to sue either for a full refund of the purchase price
on tender of the security or for damages if the plaintiff no
longer owns the security.21 Under either option, however, the
recovery is reduced to the extent the plaintiff has received any
income from the security.
Unlike section 12(2) of the Securities Act, neither section
10(b) of the Exchange Act22 nor Rule 10b-5,23 promulgated
thereunder, provides an express remedy for a defrauded pur-
chaser of securities.24 As a result, federal courts have necessar-
ily fashioned appropriate remedies as cases have arisen.25
20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a-78kk (1982); Banoff, To what extent will
benefits from tax shelters be permitted to offset rescission damagesl 57 J.
TAX'N 154, 157 ex.1 (1982); Note, Tax Consequences of Rescission: The Inter-
play Between Private and Public Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 562, 563 n.6 (1975).
21. Section 12(2) of the Act provides:
[A purchaser] may sue either at law or in equity in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no
longer owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). Rule 10b-5 is "a general antifraud provi-
sion that prohibits misrepresentations, omissions, or other fraudulent activity
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities." Thompson, The Mea-
sure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Dam-
ages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355 (1984).
24. Civil liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act is implied. See, e.g.,
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). As a re-
sult, Rule 10b-5 does not define remedies for such liability. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1985).
25. Federal courts exercise broad discretion in fashioning remedies for vi-
olations of the Exchange Act. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
433-35 (1964) (finding an implied cause of action under the proxy provision of
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Predictably, this exercise of judicial discretion has led to signifi-
cant variation in the determination of remedies and damages
available under Rule 10b-5. 26 The measure of damages tradi-
tionally applied, and most favored by courts, however, is the
"out-of-pocket" rule.27 Pursuant to this rule, courts award the
defrauded purchaser the difference between the price paid for
the security and the actual value received in the transaction.28
This allows the plaintiff to retain the security and sue for any
actual loss sustained.29 The purpose of the measure is to deter-
mine the amount actually lost and not what the plaintiff might
have gained.30 The out-of-pocket rule therefore precludes the
plaintiff from seeking expected profits.31
Although the out-of-pocket measure is the usual standard
for recovery in a Rule 10b-5 action, most courts recognize that a
plaintiff may instead choose rescission or a money judgment
representing the financial equivalent of rescission.3 2 The differ-
the Exchange Act on a general theory that the court may fashion any appro-
priate remedy for violation of a federal right); see also Garantz v. Stifel, Nico-
laus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that courts should
"fashion the remedy best suited to the harm"); Thompson, supra note 23, at
355 (asserting that courts are free to tailor the measure of recovery to comply
with the remedy selected).
26. Commentators list as many as a dozen separate measures of recovery
available to prospective plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5. See 5C A. JACOBS, LrIGA-
TION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 § 260.03[c][viii] (2d ed. 1985 rev.);
Sacher, An Overview of the Panoply of Remedies Available to an Aggrieved
Plaintiff Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 7 Cum. L. REv. 429, 431 (1977); Thompson,
supra note 23, at 350.
27. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1133-34
(1983).
28. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-39 (7th Cir. 1974); Es-
tate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); see also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 9.2 (1973) (describing the out-of-pocket measure as the difference
between what the plaintiff gave and received).
29. For example, a buyer paying $11 for a security worth $7 on the date of
purchase has suffered damages of $4. See D. DOBBS, supra note 28, § 9.2.
30. See Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
31. The measure is designed to put the plaintiff back in the same financial
position as before the transaction occurred but not to award any benefit of the
bargain. D. DOBBS, supra note 28, § 9.2. One court has stated that the plain-
tiff is therefore not entitled to "the expectant fruits of an unrealized specula-
tion." Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962) (citing Smith v. Boles, 132 U.S. 125, 130
(1889)). This rule is derived from the tort action of deceit. See Harris v.
American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-25 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S.
1054 (1976).
32. See In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 148-49 (N.D. Tex.
1980); see also L. Loss, SEcUtrrs REGULATION 1794 (1961) (stating that the
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ence between these two measures is that the out-of-pocket rule
allows the defrauded plaintiff to affirm the transaction, keep
what was received, and sue for damages, whereas a rescissory
remedy voids the transaction and requires the plaintiff to re-
turn the securities purchased upon receipt of the original con-
sideration paid.33 If the securities have been disposed of and
cannot be returned, the plaintiff may recover damages based on
a rescissory measure.34 The result of rescission, therefore, is to
divest the plaintiff of any interest in the transaction and return
the parties to the status quo ante.35
Regardless of the remedy sought, section 28(a) of the Ex-
change Act limits recovery under Rule 10b-536 to "actual dam-
ages [suffered] on account of the act complained of."37 The
purpose of section 28(a) is to limit a plaintiff's recovery to the
"actual damages" sustained, thereby eliminating any profits the
plaintiff might have received, or expected to receive, from the
transaction. 38
The goal of the rescission remedy, to return the parties to
the status quo ante,39 is difficult to achieve in the complex cir-
cumstances created by tax-advantaged limited partnerships.
This is particularly true for real estate limited partnerships be-
cause they are accorded a unique tax treatment.40 Current tax
plaintiff should be able to select rescission); Thompson, supra note 23, at 365
("most courts recognize that a plaintiff may instead choose rescission"); Note,
supra note 3, at 672 (a limited partner may sue either for rescission or
damages).
33. See Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L. J.
1093, 1110-14 (1977); Thompson, supra note 23, at 351.
34. See Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
35. See Note, supra note 3, at 676.
36. The Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 155 (1972), affirmed the developing consensus of the lower courts
that § 28(a) should provide guidance for 10b-5 actions. See, e.g., Richardson v.
MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 45 (10th Cir. 1971) (finding the § 28(a) limitation on
10b-5 recovery clear and binding); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d
Cir. 1968) (§ 28(a) prohibits punitive damages); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,
748 (8th Cir. 1967) (stating that the only effect of the "actual damages" lan-
guage in § 28(a) is to prohibit punitive damages), cert denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
38. See supra note 31; L. Loss, supra note 27, at 1132-34.
39. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. If rescission is awarded
in a securities fraud case, the investor returns the investment and receives the
original consideration paid for that investment. See Nelson v. Serwold, 576
F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); D. DOBBS, supra
note 28, § 9.4, at 618-20.
40. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. The benefits from a profita-
ble real estate tax shelter investment are two-fold, offering tax savings to the
[Vol. 70:11851190
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law allows the income and losses of a partnership to pass di-
rectly through to its partners.4 ' Only in real estate limited
partnerships are the partners allowed to deduct more losses
than they have actually invested or placed "at risk."42 As a re-
sult, a partner's deductions in the first year can, in some cases,
be higher than the initial capital outlay.43 Therefore, an inves-
tor who rescinds a transaction involving a real estate limited
partnership is likely to have received substantial tax benefits.
A rescissory award in such circumstances would constitute a
windfall to the extent an investor is able to both recoup the
original investment and to retain the entire tax benefit result-
ing from the earlier deductions.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has, however, consist-
ently characterized a rescission as an independent taxable
limited partner in its early years and generating income in later years. Unlike
a corporate shareholder, even if the enterprise fails to become profitable, the
investment's unique tax treatment may still allow a limited partner to fare
quite well.
A limited partner who has been misled into investing in an un-
profitable real estate venture may be in a better position than a share-
holder in an unprofitable corporation. By use of depreciation, real
estate limited partnerships can generate a substantial tax loss while
actually taking in sufficient cash to cover partnership expenses. This
tax loss can be passed through to the partners as a shelter for other
taxable income. In the extreme case where the partnership's gross
rents are exactly equal to its expenditures, the tax loss continues to
make the partnership an attractive investment. On the other hand,
the stock of a corporation having no profit or prospects of profit
would be worthless, and a shareholder in that corporation would
value any recovery in a civil suit more than his investment.
Note, supra note 3, at 672-73 (footnotes omitted).
41. See I.R.C. § 701 (1985) ("A partnership... shall not be subject to the
income tax ... ."). A partnership is thus taxed only at the partner level.
42. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1985) ("A partner's distributive share of the partner-
ship loss ... shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of such
partner's interest in the partnership ... ."). In real estate partnerships, a part-
ner's basis will include not only the original amount invested but also any non-
recourse loans the partnership, as an entity, has obtained. See I.R.C. § 752(a)
(1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Accordingly, partners today are able to
deduct losses in excess of their capital contributions. In Austin, for example,
the plaintiffs were able to take deductions not only up to the $35,000 that each
invested but also up to their proportionate share of the mortgage loan obtained
by the partnership. This is permitted because the "at risk" provisions of the
tax laws do not apply to real estate limited partnerships. See I.R.C.
§ 465(c)(3)(D) (1985).
43. See Dahlk, Real Estate Partnerships and Securities Laws: A Primer,
12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 781, 783 (1979); Fass & Howard, Current Issues Relating
to Real Estate Tax Shelters, in 1983 TAx SHELTERED INVEsTMENT HANDBOOK
94 (R. Haft & . Fass eds. 1982).
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transaction,44 which will trigger one or several mechanisms for
dealing with the potential windfall to the plaintiff. Although
the exact tax treatment of a rescissory recovery varies in each
case, a substantial number of commentators and courts have in-
dicated that the IRS would most likely attempt to invoke the
tax benefit rule in such a transaction.45 The rule generally re-
quires that when a deduction is taken in one year for an
amount subsequently recovered in a later year that amount
44. The reasons for this characterization are administrative efficiency and
the integrity of the annual accounting system. See Littenberg & Reinstein,
Deconglomeration-Tax and Business Problems Associated with the Divesti-
ture of a Recently Acquired Business, 24 U. So. CAL. L. CENTER TAX INST. 101,
117 (1972); Note, Tax Consequences of Rescission, supra note 20, at 579.
45. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984); West-
ern Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982), affd sub nora.
Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984); Holbrook v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283, 1286 (1975); Bittker & Kanner, The Tax
Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265, 272-73 (1978). I.R.C. § 111 is a partial codi-
fication of the tax benefit rule, see infra note 46 and accompanying text. The
regulations thereunder give as an example of the "other items subject to the
rule"-requiring inclusion in income-the analogous situation of a taxpayer
who deducts a loss on selling stock and subsequently recoups the loss in whole
or in part from the person who sold the taxpayer the property-for example,
for misrepresenting its value or breaching a warranty. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-
1(a)(1) (1956); see also Note, supra note 20, at 576-79 (asserting that the IRS
has the option of recapturing the purchaser's tax benefits either as ordinary
income under the tax benefit rule or by means of capital gains treatment);
Note, supra note 3, at 677 n.31 (interpreting Holbrook as indicating that the
IRS will seek tax benefit rule treatment for rescission awards with respect to
real estate limited partnerships). But see Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744
F.2d 935, 943 (2d Cir. 1984). In Salcer, the court found that the tax benefit
rule did not apply to rescissory damages, although it conceded that the rule
might apply in a case of actual rescission, apparently on the theory that once
the court applied the offset rule, any remaining rescissory damage recovery
would no longer be inconsistent with the plaintiff's prior tax return. The
court reasoned that to apply the tax benefit rule, as the Burgess court did, see
infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text, would be to "put the cart before
the horse." Id. The Austin II court, apparently following Salcer, also con-
cluded that the tax benefit rule did not apply but gave no reason for its conclu-
sion. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 955-56. The Salcer court's analysis, however, begs
the question of whether the tax benefit rule applies to the full rescissory
award in the absence of the offset rule. The question is not whether the tax
benefit rule applies once the offset has occurred, but rather whether the tax
benefit rule applies to a rescissory award. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text and infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. In dismissing the tax bene-
fit rule as inapplicable, the Salcer court makes the same mistake in reasoning
that it ascribes to the Burgess court. Even if the tax benefit rule were not to
apply, the IRS would still treat the rescissory award as an independent taxable
event that would be taxed either as ordinary income under some similar tax
provision, or at preferential capital gains rates. See supra note 44 and accom-
panying text; Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
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must be included in gross income in the year of recovery.46 The
IRS applies this rule whenever a later event is deemed funda-
mentally inconsistent with the basis for the original deduc-
tion.47 Thus, if a successful plaintiff in a securities fraud action
recovers the original purchase price, that sum is subject to taxa-
tion as ordinary income in that year's return, to the extent the
plaintiff received tax benefits resulting from the investment in
earlier years.48 Application of the tax benefit rule to such a
plaintiff/investor may substantially, or totally, eliminate any
tax savings49 realized from the investment.50
II. THE AUSTIN COURTS' ADOPTION OF
THE OFFSET RULE
Courts determining the appropriate measure of a rescissory
award in securities fraud cases have disagreed on whether to
treat tax benefits as falling within the limiting language of the
Securities Act ("income received") and the Exchange Act ("ac-
tual damages") and thus subject to offset, or whether to allow
the plaintiff full recovery subject to subsequent taxation. A
number of courts, applying the "offset rule," have construed
46. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1983);
Bittker & Kanner, sulpra note 45, at 265. The general tax benefit rule, "not
expressly stated in the Code but developed through the case law, is that, if an
amount deducted from gross income in one taxable year is recovered in a later
year, the recovery is income in the later year." 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FED-
ERAL INcoME TAXATION § 7.34 (rev. ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted). Statutory
recognition of the rule is found in § 111 of the Code, providing for exclusion
from gross income of income attributable to the recovery of bad debts, prior
taxes, and delinquency amounts deducted in an earlier year, but providing no
tax benefit when deducted. I.R.C. § 111 (1985).
47. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983). A
typical tax benefit situation involves a taxpayer who takes a charitable deduc-
tion for a contribution that is returned in a subsequent year. See Note, supra
note 20, at 568. Although not expressly described in the Treasury Regulations
under I.R.C. § 111, rescission of an investment, and its consequent restoration
of the status quo ante, would probably be deemed "inconsistent" with prior de-
ductions taken on account of that investment. See Bittker & Kanner, supra
note 45, at 265, 272-74.
48. See Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
See generally Bittker & Kanner, supra note 45 (describing the tax benefit rule
as embracing a wide range of receipts).
49. See Note, supra note 20, at 578 (referring to a hypothetical rescission
of a limited partnership interest where application of the tax benefit rule
would serve to eliminate the plaintiff's entire tax benefit).
50. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984); West-
ern Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982), affd sub nom.




the statutory restrictions broadly, requiring that any economic
benefit to the plaintiff, including tax benefits, be taken into ac-
count to reduce the damages awarded.5 1 Others have read the
statutes narrowly allowing the plaintiff to retain the tax bene-
fits received and recognizing that the plaintiff must, in turn, in-
cur tax liability upon recovery.52 The two approaches lead to
quite different results. Under the offset rule, the plaintiff's re-
covery may be substantially reduced or entirely eliminated.5 3
As a result, the IRS will be precluded from recouping the de-
ductions previously received by the plaintiff. Under the alter-
native approach, the plaintiff is assured of an after-tax recovery
of no less than half of the original investment and the IRS, in
turn, will recapture at least some of the tax benefits granted.-
Austin 1 5 was the first circuit court case in which tax
benefits were offset against a rescissory award in a securities
fraud case involving a tax-advantaged investment.56 In Austin
I, the defrauded plaintiffs sought recovery of their original in-
vestment in the limited partnership. The defendant argued
that despite any fraud he may have committed, the plaintiffs
suffered no actual damages because they received a tangible
economic benefit from the partnership in the form of large tax
write-offs.57 In upholding the Austin 158 decision requiring tax
benefits to be offset against damages, the Austin I159 court
adopted a broad reading of the statutory limitations on dam-
51. See Austin I, 768 F.2d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 1985); Freschi v. Grand Coal
Venture, 767 F.2d 1041, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985); Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp.,
744 F.2d 935, 941-43 (2d Cir. 1984); Austin , 675 F.2d 168, 183 (8th Cir. 1982).
52. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1984);
Western Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 821 (D. Ariz. 1982), affd sub
nom. Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984); Spatz v.
Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton
& Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
53. In the Austin case the plaintiffs' tax benefits came close to equaling,
and for one plaintiff exceeded, the original amount invested. See supra notes
14, 17, 19; see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the
deductions allowed in a real estate limited partnership).
54. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
55. 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir.
1985), cert granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-519).
56. This issue had been addressed several times at the district court level.
See, e.g., Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 586 (N.D. IlM. 1981); Wiesenber-
ger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
57. Austin , 675 F.2d at 181; see supra note 17.
58. 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982), affid on rehearing, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir.
1985), cert granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-519).
59. 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985), cert granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov.
12, 1985) (No. 85-519).
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ages, dismissing the contrary arguments raised in several other
similar cases. 60
The two Austin decisions are based primarily on the "ac-
tual damages" provision of section 28(a) of the Exchange Act.61
The courts interpreted this provision to require that a rescis-
sory award62 be reduced to reflect any value received as a re-
sult of the fraudulent transaction.63 Applying the statute in
accordance with this interpretation, the Austin I court con-
cluded that tax benefits realized as a result of a tax shelter in-
vestment are "something of value"' ' and a "tangible economic
benefit"' ' and, therefore, must be deducted from any damages
awarded.
Although its decision was premised on the "actual dam-
ages" language of section 28(a), the Austin I court applied this
analysis not only to the Rule 10b-5 claims explicitly limited by
section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, but also to claims arising
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act.66 Although the Se-
curities Act does not explicitly limit rescissory damages to "ac-
tual damages" sustained, the Austin II court asserted that
"section 12(2) implicitly incorporates the actual damages princi-
ple" by limiting a plaintiffs recovery to the consideration paid,
less any income received.67 From this, the Austin II court fur-
ther found that the words "income received" should be con-
strued as including tax benefits received as a result of a tax
shelter investment.63 Thus, while recognizing that tax benefits
60. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 953-54; see supra note 52.
61. Austin I, 768 F.2d at 953; Austin , 675 F.2d at 180. Both courts stated
that damages for securities fraud "are determined in accordance with the ex-
tent to which false and misleading information actually harmed the com-
plaining party."
62. The Austin courts used the terms "rescission" and "restitution" inter-
changeably. See Austin I, 768 F.2d at 954; Austin I, 675 F.2d at 181. Often
rescission serves as a prelude to restitutionary recovery, but there is an impor-
tant distinction between the two remedies. See Jacobs, supra note 33, at 1110-
11. Restitution is a much broader remedy than rescission. See D. DOBBS,
supra note 28, § 4.1, at 222. Rescission attempts to return the injured party to
the status quo ante. The goal of restitution, however, is to avoid unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant. See id. § 4.1, at 223-27.
63. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 953; Austin I, 675 F.2d at 181.
64. Austin I, 675 F.2d at 182.
65. Id. See supra note 40 for the explanation that tax benefits resulting
from a tax shelter investment are a "tangible economic benefit."
66. Austin I, 675 F.2d at 181. "The actual damages principle.., applies in
the instant case not only to the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, but also to
claims under Section 12(2) ... ." Id
67. Austin I, 768 F.2d at 954.
68. Id.
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are not income in "a strict accounting sense," 69 the Austin II
court nevertheless interpreted the term "income" to include
tax benefits. In support of its interpretation, the Austin II
court reasoned that the section 12(2) limitation reflects a gen-
eral securities law policy restricting damage awards to those
strictly compensatory in nature.70 According to the Austin II
court, therefore, "all economic benefits bargained for and re-
ceived must be deducted from plaintiffs' damages.
'71
Finally, the Austin II court dismissed the argument that
the offset rule unfairly operates to prevent the Internal Reve-
nue Service from recovering a portion of the tax benefits re-
ceived by the plaintiffs as a result of their investment.72 The
court reasoned that because the development had met all the
applicable tax code criteria, there was no justification for the
Government's claim.73
The Austin II court's analysis is flawed in several re-
spects.74 Its interpretation of the damage limitations in the Se-
69. Id. at 955.
70. "[T]he strictly compensatory nature of damages awarded in private se-
curities fraud actions requires that such value be taken into account in deter-
mining whether and to what extent damages were inflicted upon plaintiffs."
Austin II, 768 F.2d at 955 (quoting Austin I, 675 F.2d at 183).
71. Id.
72. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 956.
73. Relying on a recent Second Circuit decision that had followed Austin
I, Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
limited partners charging securities fraud in a real estate limited partnership
must deduct tax benefits in calculating rescissory damages in a securities fraud
action), the Austin II court found any attempt by the IRS to recoup such de-
ductions inappropriate in these circumstances, reasoning that the deductions
were granted to encourage real estate development and since the hotel had ac-
tually been built, the Government had received what it had bargained for.
Austin II, 768 F.2d at 956. Because there was no suggestion that the project
did not meet the tax requirements relating to real estate developments, any
obligations owed to the Government were satisfied. Id. ("The government got
the residential development that it hoped to encourage by offering the tax
benefits taken by the plaintiffs. Thus, it is 'banking' precisely what it agreed
to 'bank'. There is no suggestion that the project did not meet federal require-
ments as a viable housing development entitling its owners to tax benefits.")
(quoting Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1984)).
74. In the intervening period between Austin I and Austin II, the Ninth
and Eighth Circuits declined to follow the offset rule. In Burgess v. Premier
Corp., 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984), investors in a tax shelter investment involv-
ing the purchase and resale of cattle sought rescission of their investment
under the federal securities laws. The court specifically declined to follow
Austin, holding that damages should be set without consideration of the tax
benefits plaintiffs had received. Id at 837-38. In Hayden v. McDonald, 742
F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1984), the court held that, under a state law very similar to
§ 12(2), the language "income received" did not include tax benefits. Id at
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curities Act and the Exchange Act was overly broad. In
addition, the court refused to recognize the Government's inter-
est in the transaction. Finally, the court also failed to ade-
quately consider important policies underlying the applicable
securities laws.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Austin II court advanced a novel interpretation of sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Act in classifying tax benefits re-
ceived by plaintiffs as income. It found that the statutory term
"income" does not mean income in a strict accounting sense75
but rather construed the term to encompass all economic bene-
fit received by the plaintiffs.76 The court supported this inter-
pretation by citing the general policy that damage awards in
private securities actions should be strictly compensatory in
nature.77 The term "income," however, should be interpreted
in a more restrictive sense to mean profits derived directly
from the investment, such as stock dividends, interest, or other
distributions that are typically required to be offset in comput-
ing rescissory damages. 78
In contrast to the Austin courts' interpretation of income,
applicable case law supports the view that tax benefits received
by a plaintiff are distinguishable from income. In Johns Hop-
kins University v. Hutton,79 a Maryland district court found
that payments in an oil and gas limited partnership applied to
440-41. Nevertheless, despite this and other authority to the contrary, see
Western Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818 (D. Ariz. 1982), affd sub nom.
Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984); Spatz v. Boren-
stein, 513 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35
F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the Eighth Circuit, en banc, upheld in Austin II
the earlier Austin I decision adopting the offset rule.
75. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 955.
76. Id.
77. Id. ("[Tihe strictly compensatory nature of damages awarded in pri-
vate securities fraud actions requires that such value be taken into account
78. See, e.g., Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423, 441 (8th Cir. 1984) (find-
ing that the term "income" covered benefits received from the defendant such
as production checks, but not the financial benefits or consequences of federal
and state tax laws); see also infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
79. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), affd in parA rev'd in part 422 F.2d
1124 (4th Cir. 1970), on remand, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971), affd in par
rev'd in part 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). The con-
troversy in that case involved plaintiff's purchase of an oil and gas production
payment. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant materially misrepresented
and omitted facts material to the transaction in the offering circular. The
court, in a complex ruling, ordered rescission of the transaction. Id at 1226.
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taxes were not "income" under section 12(2). ° The defendant
in Johns Hopkins argued that despite any fraud that had been
committed, the court should find the tax benefits received by
the plaintiff to be income within the meaning of the statute.81
The court rejected the defendant's argument as an attempt to
"rewrite the remedial language of the statute" and held that
only payments received as the equivalent of interest could cor-
rectly be construed as income for purposes of section 12(2).82
The court thus refused to characterize the tax benefits received
by the plaintiff as "income."83
More recently, the Eighth Circuit in Hayden v. McDon-
ald, 4 decided in the period between the Austin I and Austin II
decisions, construed the term "income" to cover only benefits
received from the defendants, not the financial benefits or con-
sequences of federal and state tax laws.8s In Hayden, the
Eighth Circuit noted that the term "income" encompasses ben-
efits directly attributable to the efforts of the developer and the
success of the investment.86 The court thus distinguished tax
benefits from income presumably because they flow not from
the developer but are a result of a general tax program
designed by the Government to encourage investment.8 7




84. 742 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1984) (decided by a panel different from the
panel that decided Austin I); see supra note 74.
85. Id. at 440-41.
86. Id.
87. Id. Other courts have similarly refused to reduce a defendant's liabil-
ity under § 12(2) by the amount of tax benefits a plaintiff has received and so
have implicitly refused to interpret the term "income" to include tax benefits.
In Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York denied the defendant's re-
quest that the plaintiff's income tax returns be produced in order to show that
the plaintiff had received a tax savings. The Wiesenberger court characterized
the argument that plaintiff's damages should be reduced by the amount of
taxes saved as a result of the investment as "without merit." Id. at 558. The
court also noted that it seemed "wide of the mark to argue an 'injustice' to
[the] defendant ... if it cannot reduce the amount of the claim against it by
the amount of taxes saved by [the] plaintiff through deductions for his losses,
depletion, etc. The claim is for damages caused to plaintiffs by [the] defend-
ants." Id. More recently, the District Court for the Northern District of Ii-
nois, in Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1981) dismissed the
argument that tax benefits could be used to reduce a defendant's damages
under § 12(2), regarding it as "wholly unpersuasive." Id. at 586. The court
reasoned that the fact that the plaintiff may be better off vis-a-vis the Govern-
ment did not warrant the application of the offset rule. Id.
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The Austin courts' interpretation of section 28(a) is simi-
larly flawed. As noted above,8 8 the Austin courts based their
adoption of the offset rule primarily on the "actual damages"
limitation of section 28(a) of the Exchange Act. Section 28(a),
however, does not dictate the results reached in the Austin
cases. There is substantial authority to the effect that the pur-
pose of the "actual damages" language in section 28(a) is to pre-
vent double recovery by plaintiffs asserting both state and
federal law claims arising out of the same facts and to prohibit
recovery of punitive damages.8 9 In fact, the Austin II court's
opinion disregards a previous Eighth Circuit case, Myzel v.
Fields,90 which found that the only effect of the actual damages
limitation is to prohibit punitive damages otherwise available in
state civil actions under the Exchange Act.91
Whatever the intended effect of the actual damages provi-
sion of section 28(a), the Supreme Court has made it clear that
the provision does not prohibit recovery of "windfall" profits.
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,92 which involved a
defrauded seller suing under Rule 10b-5, the Court determined
that the correct measure of damages was the difference be-
tween the fair value of what was actually received for the se-
curities and the fair value of what would have been received
absent the fraudulent conduct, "except... where the defendant
received more than the seller's actual loss. In [that] case, dam-
ages would be the amount of the defendant's profit. '93 In so
holding, the Court construed the section 28(a) limitation so as
not to prevent the plaintiffs from recovering more than their
actual loss. It is difficult to reconcile the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the section 28(a) limitation, permitting the
recovery of windfall profits, with the Austin courts' inter-
88. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
89. See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981); see also 3 L. Loss,
supra note 27, at 1624. A narrow interpretation of the actual damages princi-
ple is also reflected in the structure of § 28(a). The first sentence provides
that the rights and remedies in the Exchange Act are "in addition to any and
all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1982). The purpose of this sentence is to make it clear that federal
remedies do not preempt remedies existing under state laws. The next sen-
tence in § 28(a) restricts awards to actual damages. Id- Thus the second sen-
tence is designed to prevent a plaintiff from recovering more than once for the
same violation or cause of action.
90. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
91. Id. at 748; see 3 L. LOss, supra note 27, at 1624.
92. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
93. Id. at 155 (citing Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965)).
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pretation of the same provision as prohibiting a defrauded
plaintiff from retaining any tax benefits realized as a result of
the fraudulent transaction.
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit in Myzel,94 and, at least im-
plicitly, the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute,95 have recognized
that it is more appropriate to give the benefit of any windfall to
the defrauded plaintiff than to allow the defendant to benefit
from its fraudulent conduct.96 The Austin courts, by contrast,
rejected such an approach, choosing instead to apply an overly
restrictive interpretation of section 28(a).
IV. THE GOVERNMENT AS AN INTERESTED PARTY
Also weighing against application of the offset rule in se-
curities fraud litigation is that it would preclude the Govern-
ment from asserting a legitimate claim to recapture tax benefits
in such cases. The Austin courts mistakenly assumed that a
tax shelter investment involves only two parties-the pur-
chaser of the security and the seller/promoter. This assump-
tion led the Austin II court to conclude that the tax benefits
received by the investor were attributable to the promoter and
so should have been accounted for in the calculation of a rescis-
sory award.97 In arriving at any computation of a plaintiff's re-
covery for losses caused by securities fraud involving a tax
shelter, however, a court should acknowledge the impact of
such an award on the Government as, essentially, a third party
participant. 98 Benefits received by an investor in the form of
94. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968). The policy of preferring that plaintiffs rather than defendants ben-
efit from any windfall was first articulated in Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). The Janigan plaintiffs sold their
stock to the corporation's president for approximately $40,000; less than two
years later, the defendant sold the stock for $700,000. Id. at 783. The court ap-
proved recovery of defendant's net profit from the resale. Id. at 786-87.
95. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). In
Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court cited both Myzel and Janigan with ap-
proval. Id.
96. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
879 (1965). Lower courts have extended Janigan to include defrauded pur-
chasers as well. See, e.g., Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 801-02
(2d Cir.) (the thrust of the rationale in Janigan and Ute does not preclude
windfall profits to purchasers), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); see also
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 1982) (although unjust en-
richment generally occurs when buyer defrauds seller, it can also occur when
innocent party is induced to buy securities).
97. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 955.
98. Note, supra note 20, at 573 (profits earned in the form of tax benefits
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tax deductions result not only from the actions of the investor
and promoter in the purchase and sale of the security but also
from the Government's policy allowing such deductions.99
These deductions are essentially a form of subsidy in the nature
of an interest-free loan,10 0 with the amount of the loan depan-
dent on the investor's tax situation. Because the plaintiff sub-
sequently recoups the original amount of the investment on
rescission,10 1 the Government should be allowed an opportunity
to recapture the tax benefits the plaintiff realized from the
investment. 02
The Austin II court responded to the Government's claim
to tax revenues by asserting that the Government received
what it had bargained for. Recognizing that the tax laws are
designed to create incentives for real estate investment which
would further the Government's public policy objectives, 10 3 the
court concluded that so long as the development met all of the
tax code criteria for such an investment, the Government had
received all of the benefits from the investment that it had bar-
gained for and therefore its claim to any tax revenues was un-
founded.10 4  This analysis, however, oversimplifies the
Government's interest as a co-venturer in the investment.10 5
Absent any fraud, the Government may have received what it
bargained for when the building was sold in foreclosure and
certain tax benefits previously received by the investors were
recaptured. 0 6 When the investment fails due to the promoter's
cannot be treated solely as a private law issue-a court ordering rescission
should always investigate the manner in which the Government will approach
the rescinded transaction).
99. See, e.g., Thompson, sup'ra note 23, at 390 ("The plaintiff who receives
a tax benefit obtains his advantage from the government, not from the defen-
dant.").
100. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 6-29 (1973); Lee, An Ap-
proach to Real Estate as a Tax Oriented Investment, 49 NOTRE DAMiE LAW. 477,
493 (1974) (a purchaser of a tax shelter investment is "co-venturing" with the
Government); see also Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719, 719
(1975) (tax shelters generally provide a form of tax deferral).
101. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
103. The Government's objectives, according to the Austin II court, include
creating employment, increasing the real estate tax base, and enhancing the
local business climate. Austin I, 786 F.2d at 956.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
106. Tax shelter deductions are counterbalanced in the year the invest-
ment is sold by requiring the investor to include in the "amount realized," for
purposes of computing the taxable gain, the amount of debt from which the
investor is thereby discharged. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317
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fraud, however, the terms of the bargain must be reevaluated.
The Austin II court should have recognized that, at the very
least, the Government did not agree to subsidize the fraudulent
activities of the defendant. In addition, if the fraud affected the
value of the development, the sale price will be depressed, and,
as a consequence, the Government will necessarily recapture
less than it would have in the absence of such fraud.10 7 If, un-
like the Austin case, rescission occurs prior to a sale or foreclo-
sure of the building, the offset rule will leave the plaintiff with
no Lax benefit to be recaptured and, because the defendant did
not take the deductions, upon sale of the building the Govern-
ment will be left without a party to tax.08 This result violates
the basic tax doctrine that deductions are not outright grants,
but rather a form of tax deferral.10 9 That doctrine dictates that
when an investment is ultimately sold or otherwise disposed of,
the tax benefits realized must be returned to the Govern-
ment."10
Regardless of whether the Government received what it
bargained for, as a matter of public policy a court ordering re-
scission should not preempt the Government's right to recap-
ture the tax benefits granted. If the offset rule is applied, the
Government is precluded from recovering the tax liability owed
(1983); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1947). Generally speaking, a
partner's gain on disposition of the investment will be taxable at preferential
capital gains rates. Some of the tax benefits generated during a tax shelter's
early years, however, such as accelerated depreciation, will be subject to recap-
ture as ordinary income. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 48(q), 1245, 1250 (1985); Commis-
sioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303 n.2 (1983).
107. To the extent that the Government is able to recapture less, the Gov-
ernment has also been a victim of the defendant's fraud. See Burgess v. Pre-
mier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984); Western Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 553
F. Supp. 818, 821 (D. Ariz. 1982), aff'd sub nom Western Fed. Corp. v. Erick-
son, 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984).
108. As one commentator noted, application of the offset rule when no sale
of the development has taken place would "in effect preempt the claim of the
Internal Revenue Service to tax benefits that actually belong to the Govern-
ment." Note, supra note 20, at 578. Oddly enough, the commentator con-
cludes that the most efficient and equitable method of solving this problem is
to return the tax benefits to the defendant by means of a tax deduction rather
than an offset to the defendant's liability. . at 573-78.
109. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 963 (Lay, C.J., dissenting); see 4 R. HAFT & P.
FASS, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS § 0.03, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1981); Ginsburg,
supra note 100, at 719.
110. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984); Western
Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 533 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982), affd sub norm West-
ern Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984); Note, supra note 20,
at 568, 578.
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by the plaintiff upon rescission.-"1 To this extent, the offset
rule relieves the defendant of fraud liability at the Govern-
ment's expense.
By acknowledging the Government's valid interest in the
transaction, the Austin courts also would have been able to
more adequately address the issue of a possible windfall to the
plaintiff. Instead the courts limited their analysis of this issue
to a bald assertion that a plaintiff can recover no more than his
or her economic loss." What the court failed to recognize,
however, is that upon rescission the Government will use the
tax benefit rule to recapture, in whole or in part, any tax bene-
fit windfall realized by the plaintiff.113
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in Burgess v.
Premier Corp.,114 analyzed the offset issue in terms of all three
parties to the transaction. The court concluded that the plain-
tiff would not experience a "windfall" because the tax laws
would treat any rescissory recovery in a manner that would
largely wash out any prior tax savings. 115 Thus, if, as is typical,
the period of investment extends over several years and the
prior tax years are closed, the tax laws will treat the rescissory
award as a separate transaction and will apply the tax benefit
rule to recapture at least a portion of the plaintiff's windfall.1 6
111. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
112. Austin II, 768 F.2d at 954; Austin I, 675 F.2d at 181.
113. See supra notes 44-50.
114. 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984).
115. See id. at 838; see also Western Fed. Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818,
820 (D. Ariz. 1982), affd sub nom. Western Fed. Corp. v. Erickson, 739 F.2d
1439 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[Ihe net tax benefit will be nothing.").
116. See supra notes 44-50. It should also be noted that the tax benefit rule
may not create complete transactional equivalence even where the amount of
the earlier deductions equals the amount of the subsequent recovery. See Bitt-
ker & Kanner, supra note 45, at 270 ("[T]he rule by no means insures that the
tax on the recovery will be equal to the tax savings attributable to the prior
deduction."). The tax rates and the plaintiff's marginal tax bracket may
change in the period between the transaction and rescission. The Supreme
Court noted this aspect of the tax benefit rule in Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Com-
missioner, 460 U.S. 370, 380-81, n.12 (1983), stating that the purpose of the tax
benefit rule is not to achieve mathematical perfection but "to achieve rough
transactional parity in tax." Courts, however, have been satisfied with the re-
sulting adjustment and have not insisted on exacting a tax equal to the
amount saved by the taxpayer in the earlier year. See Bittker & Kanner,
supra note 45, at 271. While this result may, as in Austin, allow an injured
plaintiff to ultimately recover an amount in excess of the actual economic loss
sustained, courts have traditionally viewed the result as the "most satisfactory
outcome." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 503
(1968) ("the rough result of not taking account of taxes for the year of injury
but then taxing [the] recovery when received seems the most satisfactory out-
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Even if under the the tax benefit rule the plaintiff receives
some windfall because not all prior tax savings are recap-
tured,117 such a result is more consistent with the policies un-
derlying the securities laws than a result that allows a
defendant to escape full liability.118 As noted above,n 9 in secur-
ities fraud cases it is more appropriate to grant a windfall to a
defrauded plaintiff than to accord any benefit to a party guilty
of fraud.120 Additionally, courts have long recognized that the
federal securities laws are designed both to compensate the vic-
tim and to deter fraud. 12 The best way to promote the deter-
rent policies of the securities laws is to hold a guilty defendant
fully liable for the fraudulent conduct. The policies underlying
the securities laws, therefore, are better served by rejecting the
offset rule, which essentially credits the defendant's liability
with the plaintiff's tax benefits.
Moreover, courts have generally viewed a plaintiff's receipt
of tax benefits related to a particular investment as purely a
matter between the taxpayer and the Government and not as a
basis for reducing damages arising from ordinary securities
transactions.122 Upon rescission, the plaintiff settles any obliga-
tions owing the Government by complying with the applicable
tax provisons.123 Rescission of the investment is thereby ac-
complished to the greatest degree possible when dealing with a
come"). In addition, where the deductions and the recovery are not equal,
which may well occur in a highly leveraged tax shelter investment, see supra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text, the tax benefit may not be completely
washed out, although it may be substantially decreased.
117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. When the tax benefit
rule is employed, the recovery is treated as ordinary income if the earlier loss
or expense was deducted from ordinary income. Conversely, if the earlier de-
duction was taken as a capital loss, the recovery will be taxed at capital gains
rates. See Bittker and Kanner, supra note 45, at 276.
119. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
120. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).
121. See Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied,
439 U.S. 970 (1978) ("To allow violators of the Act to profit by their miscon-
duct would undermine the deterrence that the Act was intended to effect.").
122. See Note, supra note 20, at 565-66; see, e.g., Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hut-
ton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34
F.R.D. 482, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); cf. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,
238 (2d Cir.) (liability under § 16(b) of the Exchange Act should be determined
regardless of the tax rules), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
123. See supra notes 44-50.
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transaction which involves the Government as well as the two
parties. That the plaintiff may be better off vis-a-vis the Gov-
ernment does not mandate application of the offset rule. The
plaintiff and the Government fare only as well under the tax
laws as the Government intends.124 There is no reason to in-
volve the courts in what is essentially a tax matter between the
plaintiff and the Government.
In addition, the Austin courts' adoption of the offset rule
conflicts with the "collateral source" doctrine. According to
this common-law rule, courts should not credit benefits re-
ceived by an injured party from other sources-such as insur-
ance-against the defendant's liability, even though the pay-
ments may cover all or part of the harm for which the defend-
ant is liable.us The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains
that a benefit directed to the injured party should not be
shifted so as to create a windfall for a defendant tortfeasor if
the benefit did not come from the defendant. 2 6 In cases such
as Austin, the tax benefits conferred by the Government are es-
sentially "collateral" and any offset should therefore be prohib-
ited by the collateral source rule.
The Austin II court considered the collateral source rule is-
sue but concluded that the tax benefits were not derived from a
collateral source. Adopting the reasoning of the Second Cir-
cuit,1 7 the court stated that the tax benefits, although con-
ferred by the Government, emanated directly from the tax
shelter organized and operated by the defendant. s28 The plain-
tiffs' tax savings, however, were not wholly or even primarily
attributable to the defendant. The promoter of a tax shelter in-
vestment plays only a partial role in securing tax savings for
the investor. Although the defendant in Austin structured and
operated a bona fide real estate venture and was at least par-
tially responsible for the tax deductions taken by the plaintiffs,
the plaintiffs' tax benefits were conferred by the Govern-
ment.129 Moreover, it was the investors' tax situation that ena-
bled them to obtain any tax savings. As one court noted, "it
would be a great 'injustice' to [the] plaintiff to reduce such
damages for extraneous reasons wholly unconnected with the
124. See supra note 46.
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979).
126. Id. § 920A comment b.
127. See Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 941-42 (2d Cir.
1984).
128. 768 F.2d at 956.
129. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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acts of defendants.' 30
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Aside from the problems of statutory interpretation and
those related to the recognition of the Government's interest in
the transaction, public policy considerations also militate
against adoption of the offset rule. Because the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has limited enforcement re-
sources, the civil remedies provided by the Securities Act are
important in deterring securities fraud.131 These remedies are
particularly significant for tax shelter investment securities be-
cause these securities are usually sold in private offerings ex-
empt from the registration requirements of the securities laws
and, therefore, are not reviewed by the SEC.' 32 The offset rule
of the Austin courts, however, reduces litigation incentives for
victims of securities fraud. An investor with a cause of action
under the securities laws will sue only when the benefits of
successful litigation outweigh the costs. 133 Under the offset
rule, defrauded investors will have little incentive to bring
claims in the face of securities law violations if tax deductions
equal or exceed the initial investment, because the investor
may recover little or nothing from the defrauding promoter.
From the promoter's perspective, as potential civil liability de-
creases, the incentive to make adequate disclosures concerning
the investment will decrease.13 Moreover, in the unlikely
event that an investor does sue, 3 5 the fraudulent promoter will
only be liable insofar as the investor's tax benefits fail to cover
the amount of the original investment. Thus, to the extent the
offset rule decreases the probability of private actions and the
size of potential liabilities, it undermines the deterrent provi-
sions of the federal securities laws.
130. Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
131. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1963) (characterizing pri-
vate actions for violations of the antifraud provisions as a "necessary supple-
ment" to the enforcement activities of the SEC); Note, supra note 3, at 670.
132. Austin 1, 768 F.2d at 957 n.13. The Securities Act of 1933 exempts
certain securities from its registration requirements because of the "small
amount involved" or because of the limited character of the offering. See 15
U.S.C. § 77(c) (1982). The Act also exempts certain transactions because of the
nature of the transactions or the participants. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1982).
133. Note, supra note 3, at 671.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The Austin II court's decision requiring the offset of tax
benefits against damages in securities fraud litigation involving
tax shelter investments is flawed. The court's interpretation of
the applicable statutory damage limitations was overly broad
and, with respect to the Securities Act, without precedent. In
addition, the court treated the tax shelter investment transac-
tion too simplistically, failing to recognize the important inter-
ests of the Government. Finally, the decision runs counter to
public policy considerations underlying the securities laws. The
effect of the decision ill be to unfairly shift the economic con-
sequences of fraud to the Government. The offset rule thus re-
sults in a windfall to the defrauding defendant at the expense
of the plaintiff, the Government, and, ultimately, the taxpayers.
Karin J Birkeland
